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Abstract 
This paper represents an attempt to integrate the concept of corporate 
entrepreneurship with the emerging literature on social capital. Corporate 
entrepreneurship (Burgelman, 1983) focuses on the activities of individuals who 
take-on responsibility for organisational innovation and change. Ideas associated 
with social capital draw attention to the importance of workplace relationships which 
provide resources for individuals based on mutual obligations, trust and expectations 
(Coleman, 1988). Empirical data are drawn from a long-term study of MFD a mature 
manufacturing firm located in a small town in north Wales. Change was initiated by 
the owner/managing director who was concerned about declining activity as the 
company lost its core business with the Ministry of Defence. The corporate 
entrepreneur was a middle manager who joined the company less than one year 
before the change programme began. Because he was new to the company, the 
corporate entrepreneur did not have reciprocal obligations to other employees and 
was able to identify a range of ‘brokerage opportunities’ (Burt, 1992) which he used 
to breakdown barriers between departments and between senior managers and other 
employees. 
Keywords:; Entrepreneurial behaviour, Social capital, Innovation Organisation 
change,  
4 
Introduction: Managing Maturity 
MFD,  a privately-owned  company, was founded over 50 years ago to supply 
casting and machined components to the Ministry of Defence (MoD). A decline in 
defence-related work meant that between 1992 and 1994 the workforce was reduced 
by 50% to approximately 450. The owner/manager, increasingly concerned about the 
company’s ability to survive, recruited three middle managers with experience in 
other manufacturing companies. Gradually, a range of new technologies were 
introduced which were utilised to develop new products, improve manufacturing  
processes and create better communication systems. The main change agent, in 
contrast to most other long-serving staff, had extensive experience in a mass-
production environment. He drew on this experience to instigate a range of changes 
which revolutionised activities within the company. 
Change management has attracted a considerable amount of academic interest since 
the emergence of the field of inquiry termed ‘organisation theory’ (Pugh, 1984).  
Beginning with the seminal work of Lewin (1947) and including important 
contributions by Bennis (1964) through to more  recent work (Eden and Huxham, 
1996; Hartley et al, 1997) the concept of  ‘change agent’ has been a central feature of 
academic research. North American influence has encouraged wider usage of terms 
such as ‘corporate entrepreneur’ (Burgelman, 1983) and ‘intrapreneur’ (Pinchot, 
1985)  in the management literature. One consistent theme in such work is that 
corporate entrepreneurs are ‘social deviants’ prepared to break organisational rules in 
implementing change (Schon, 1963; Shane, 1994; Markham, 2000). In contrast, work 
dealing with social capital focuses attention on the value of social relationships in 
providing resources to entrepreneurs (Coleman, 1988). Hanifan (1920) was perhaps 
the first person to explicitly use the term social capital in referring to ‘good will, 
fellowship, sympathy and social intercourse among.... a social unit’. In recent years 
the term have increasingly been adopted by a wide range of scholars concerned with 
the study of organizations (Adler and Kwon, 2002).  The concept of social capital 
has been particularly attractive to those studying networks with debates about the 
relative importance of open and closed systems. Burt (1992)argues that sparse social 
networks mean the inherent ‘openness creates many ‘brokerage opportunities’. Those 
influenced by ‘structural hole theory’ believe that the consistent norms fostered by 
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cohesive networks limit opportunities open to individual actors. While Bourdieu 
(1985) suggests that social capital is mobilised as a result of resources which accrue 
to groups or individuals from their institutionalised relationships which are the 
outcome of durable networks. The concepts of corporate entrepreneurship and social 
capital are brought together in the work of Chung and Gibbons (1997). While their 
work provides some insight into the importance of social capital for corporate 
entrepreneurship the econometric approach adopted by Chung and Gibbons does 
little to identify the social processes associated with such activities. 
Social Capital 
According to Cooke and Wills (1999) modern use of the term social capital began 
with the work of Jacobs (1961)who examined how the breakdown of networks 
contributed to the decline of major US cities. In a study of ‘racial income 
differences’ Loury (1977) defined social capital as naturally occurring social 
relationships which promote the development of valued skills or characteristics’. 
Contemporary writers usually begin with the work of Coleman (1988) who attempts 
to reconcile two conflicting explanations of social action. According to structural 
accounts, individual actors are socialised  into the acceptance of social norms, rules 
and obligations which constrain their behaviours (see Wrong, 1961). The alternative 
view is that individuals set goals independently and act in a manner which is entirely 
rational and self-interested (Minford, 1992; Smith,1993). Coleman (1988) examines 
ways in which social relations constitute useful resources for individual actors. 
Reciprocity, based on obligations, expectations and trust, is central to the creation of 
social capital. Individuals help others because they trust them to reciprocate and, as 
such, both sides have expectations related to future behaviours. Network closure is 
important to the mobilisation of social capital because it supports the creation of 
norms and reinforces obligations and expectations. In Coleman’s terms closure 
means that  actors within particular social groupings are linked to other actors by 
more than one ‘tie’ (cf Burt, 1992). Closure is essential in ensuring that there is a 
willingness to share information with colleagues which is particularly important in 
organizational settings. 
Adler and Kwon (2002) point out that social capital is ‘gaining currency’ in a range 
of areas related to organization studies including: career success (Burt, 1992), job 
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search (Granovetter, 1995), product innovation (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998),  
intellectual capital (Hargadon and Sutton, 1997), corporate entrepreneurship (Chung 
and Gibbons, 1997), new business formation (Walker et al, 1997), supply chain 
relations (Uzzi, 1997), regional production networks (Romo and Schwartz, 1998) and 
inter-firm learning (Kraatz, 1998). The core of social capital is that goodwill  drawn 
from family, friends, workmates and other acquaintances provides a range of 
valuable resources including information, influence and solidarity (Sandefur and 
Laumann, 1998). The nature of network relations provides a range of opportunities 
for actors to ‘leverage’ resources. In network theory attention is focused on the 
quality of various ties including their frequency, intensity, multiplexity and density 
(Scott, 2000). Weak ties, as well as strong ties, are often invaluable in providing 
information and accessing resources (Granovetter, 1985; 1973). More recently, 
Portes (1998) suggests a number of factors  influence motivation including 
internalised norms acquired as a result of primary or secondary socialisation 
(Goffman, 1961). Secondly,  ‘instrumental’ motivations are based on obligations 
created during social exchange or what Portes (1998) describes as enforced trust. 
Opportunity and motivation must be complemented by individual abilities which 
refers to competences and resources which can be identified at network nodes. Some 
regard associability, which is related to the extent to which groups define and enact 
their goals, as a source of social capital (Leana and Van Buren, 1999). Others suggest 
ability is related to network outcomes such as trust, norms and shared beliefs 
amongst actors (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). All three elements, motivation, 
opportunity and ability, must be present for social capital to be motivated. The 
authors stress that their ‘tripartite schema is a heuristic guide to the proximate causes 
of social capital exchange’ (Alder and Kwon, 2002:27). 
Galunic and Moran (2000) hypothesise  managerial performance (contribution to 
sales and innovation) will be positively related to the number of ties and the extent to 
which there are ‘structural holes’ (Burt, 1992; Burt et al, 2000). The authors studied 
managers working in 170 operating units of a global pharmaceutical company. 
Completed questionnaires were received from 139 managers (69% response rate) 
involved with sales and innovation. Results confirmed links between social capital 
and the performance of individual managers and their organizations. One interesting 
element was that structural embeddedness was more robust in explaining sales 
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performance and relational embeddedness was more strongly related to innovation 
performance. According to the authors, because sales activity is typified by the 
exchange of ‘relatively tangible resources’ network positioning is more important 
than the quality of those ties. In contrast, innovation activities are characterised by 
the exchange of intangible resources with the associated higher levels of uncertainty 
and risk. As a consequence, tacit knowledge is more likely to be passed between 
strong ties rather than weaker linkages. 
‘To sum, our study suggests the usefulness of breaking down the 
concept of social capital into its structural and relational dimensions, 
noting the relevant advantages of these dimensions of social capital to 
different ways in which managers can add value to their firms’ 
(Galunic and Moran, 2000:23). 
 
Social capital is distinct from other forms of capital in that it cannot be owned by 
individuals nor organizations. At the same time, social networks are a resource which 
can be mobilised as an organizational resource. Social interaction within a network 
context is affected by both microstructures (embeddedness) and macrostructures such 
as class (Woolcock, 1998).  Johanson (2001) argues that the structural hole theory 
(SHT) versus social capital theory (SCT) debate has been resolved by application in 
differing situations. The former applies in cases typified by competition (Burt, 1992) 
and the latter where cooperation is more appropriate (Walker et al, 1997). To 
examine this issue Johanson (2001) studied a group of Finnish civil servants and data 
indicated that the two theories ‘describe separate processes of social intercourse’: 
employees benefit from sparse networks and work units benefit from cohesive 
networks (Johanson, 2001:249). Cohesion and lack of cohesion can lead to social 
liabilities for both organization and individual. Managers must ensure that employees 
do not distort information or undermine accountability in their efforts to further their 
careers. Equally, social closure at the unit level increases the likelihood of inter-unit 
conflict:.. 
‘finding an optimal level of cohesion is by no means a straight-forward task’ 
(Johanson, 2001:253).  
According to Gargiulo and Benassi (2000) social networks can enhance both firm 
and individual performance in two ways: first by facilitating access to information 
and resources; secondly by helping co-ordinate task interdependencies. Cohesive 
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networks  provide considerable amounts of support for ‘entry-level’ managers who 
lack access to knowledge and resources. Alternatively, networks ‘rich’ in structural 
holes provide a wide range of opportunities for experienced managers to adopt the 
role of corporate entrepreneurs. Similarly, work related to ethnic entrepreneurs 
suggests that support and resources provided by cohesive networks are important in 
the early stages of new ventures. Eventually, constraints associated with reciprocal 
obligations made it difficult for those entrepreneurs to pursue new opportunities as 
they gain experience (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993). With regards to 
intrapreneurship, there are two factors by which cohesive networks make it difficult 
to instigate organizational change. Cohesive ties may mean that managers’ contacts 
can ‘amplify’ pressure to reciprocate past favours thereby resisting pressure for 
change. Groups that have been together for long periods of time create strong bonds 
and become isolated from external sources of information and influence. Such 
relational inertia increase the likelihood that organizations  lack the flexibility to 
adapt to new situations. Gargiulo and Benassi (2000:186) propose the following 
hypothesis: 
The higher the cohesiveness of a manager’s network the lower the 
manager’s ability to adapt the composition of that network to the co-
ordination requirements of a new task environment. 
Data were obtained from nineteen managers employed by the Italian subsidiary of a 
multi-national computer firm. At the time of the research, a special unit (DPI) was 
established to promote major organizational change within the subsidiary. Results 
confirmed that a lack of structural holes made it difficult for DPI managers to enact 
change which reflected changes in task interdependencies. Absence of structural 
holes was attributed to the managers’ networks which were based on ties forged 
through years of working in the same organizational units (Gargiulo and Benassi, 
2000:192).  
Corporate Entrepreneurship 
Social capital is linked to corporate entrepreneurship by Chung and Gibbons (1997) 
who stress the importance of values and beliefs to innovation success. The authors 
suggest that while human capital (Becker, 1994) is widely understood there is less 
clarity about ways in which corporate culture contributes to entrepreneurship. As 
defined by Coleman (1988) social capital refers to the productive potential derived 
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from structural relations between and among actors. Such a definition is similar to 
ways in which culture contributes to the ability of organizations to establish 
competitive advantage (Barney, 1986).  Chung and Gibbons (1997) conceptualise 
organizational culture as a social structure because it is based on routinised and 
enduring patterns of norms, values and beliefs. Social structures can be disaggregated 
into three autonomous levels: infrastructure, sociostructure and superstructure 
(Fombrun, 1986). Infrastructure refers to ‘the set of interdependencies’ through 
which organizational activities, such as technology and market relationship, are 
constrained (see Thompson, 1967). The organization’s administrative system and 
social relations between organizational actors, including norms and sanctions, 
comprise the sociostructure. Finally, Chung and Gibbons (1997:15) define 
superstructure as the ideological underpinnings based on dominant assumptions, 
paradigms and core values. Ideologies attract, integrate and bind individuals to an 
organization and helps create shared meaning (Beyer, 1981).  Ideology underpins 
corporate entrepreneurship because of what Thompson and Tuden (1959) term 
‘beliefs about causation’ and ‘consensus on objectives’. 
Sharma and Chrisman (1999:11) suggest that there is a ‘striking lack of consistency’ 
in definitions of both entrepreneurship and intrapreneurship. Some authors associate 
corporate entrepreneurship with business diversification through the development of 
new ventures, products or markets (Burgelman, 1983; Zahra, 1996). While Pinochot 
(1985) suggests that intrapreneurs are ‘dreamers’ who take responsibility for 
innovation of any kind within organizations. It is argued by Covin and Slevin (1991) 
that ‘independent’ and ‘corporate’ entrepreneurs (Collins and Moore, 1970) share 
three postures: risk-taking, innovativeness and proactiveness. A complementary view 
is proposed by Covin and Miles (1999) who posit that organisations themselves can 
adopt an entrepreneurial philosophy (Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990; Stopford and 
Baden-Fuller, 1994). The authors draw on work by Lumpkin and Dess (1996) who 
set out five dimensions of organizations which adopt an entrepreneurial orientation: 
autonomy, innovativeness, risk-taking, proactive and competitive aggressiveness. 
Although, Lumpkin and Dess (1996) were equivocal about whether all five elements 
were present in entrepreneurial firms. Covin and Miles (1999) suggest that there are 
two elements which define entrepreneurial organisations. First, innovation, the 
introduction of a new product, process, technology, system, technique, resource or 
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capability, is ‘at the center of the nomological network that encompasses the 
construct of corporate entrepreneurship’(Covin and Miles, 1999:49). The second 
element is that of sustaining high performance or radically improving competitive 
standing: 
‘corporate entrepreneurship is engaged to increase competitiveness 
through efforts aimed at the rejuvenation, renewal and redefinition of 
organizations, their markets or industries... It is the spark and catalyst 
that is intended to place firms on a path to competitive superiority or 
keep them in competitively advantageous positions’ (Covin and Miles, 
1999:50). 
Corporate entrepreneurs must extend existing capabilities without breaking links 
with the organization’s core competences (Floyd and Woolridge, 1999).Middle-
managers are the locus of corporate entrepreneurship because they are central to 
resolution of the capability-rigidity paradox (Leonard-Barton, 1994). In developing a 
conceptual framework Floyd and Woolridge (1999) integrate concepts from two 
distinct literatures. Knowledge theory emphasises the importance of subjectivism, 
empiricism and pragmaticism as central to the validation of organisational beliefs. 
Social network theory provides insights into the role of weak ties, actor centrality 
and emergent networks as a basis for opportunity recognition. 
‘Combining the knowledge and social elements, the model suggests 
that opportunities for entrepreneurship are perceived within 
organizations because individuals have access to unique information 
through weak social ties and because they are willing to accept ideas 
based on subjective criteria’ (Floyd and Woolridge, 1999:133). 
As noted by Hornsby et al (2002: 256) there is little empirical research ‘documenting 
and understanding the contribution middle managers make in the context of 
corporate entrepreneurship’. The authors do suggest that in the fields of strategic 
management and international business middle managers are recognised as key 
agents of organizational renewal and change. A number of influential writers 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993; Drucker, 1985; Noble and Birkinshaw, 1998; 
Woolbridge and Floyd, 1990; Quinn, 1985) point out that middle managers are 
influential in promoting corporate entrepreneurship because they link the operational 
and strategic elements of a firm’s activities. The work of Nonaka and Takeuchi 
(1995) is also important in terms of recognising the significance of what the authors 
describe as ‘middle-up-down management’. Hitt and Ireland (2000) have been at the 
forefront of attempts to integrate corporate entrepreneurship with strategic 
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management. They claim that, although the study of entrepreneurship remains 
underdeveloped in comparison to strategic management’s relative maturity, there are 
six points of ‘intersection’: innovation, organizational networks, internationalisation, 
organizational learning, top management teams and governance, growth and 
flexibility. Furthermore, there is ‘convergence’ in research related to the two topics 
with a focus on longitudinal design, dynamic analytical methods, structural equation 
modelling and cognitive mapping. At the same time, there is acceptance of a need for 
‘systematic qualitative research’ based on ethnography, case surveys and multi-case 
methods (Hitt and Ireland, 2000). Perhaps the most widely-known author in the area 
of corporate entrepreneurship is Kanter (1983; 2000) who dismisses the idea that 
innovation is chaotic and random insisting that ‘structure and social arrangements’ 
can actively stimulate innovatory activity.  
‘At its very root, the entrepreneurial process of innovation and 
change is at odds with the administrative process of ensuring 
repetitions of the past’ (Kanter, 2000:168). 
The objective of this research is to provide a detailed examination of links between 
corporate entrepreneurship as expressed through middle management and social 
capital.  There have been a number of US studies examining the role of social capital 
in providing resources and support for ethnic entrepreneurs (Amsden, 1998; Evans, 
1989). Corporate entrepreneurship has also received some attention most notably 
from Chung and Gibbons (1997) who use an econometric approach to examine the 
influence of organisational culture. Hornsby et al (2002) draw on the work of Floyd 
and Woolridge (1997) to suggest that social capital is important to corporate 
entrepreneurship because it encourages employees to take risks without fear of 
sanction. So far, there appear not have been any detailed qualitative studies 
examining ways in which social capital facilitates or restricts the activities of 
corporate entrepreneurs. 
Research Methods  
Despite widespread usage of the term there is a lack of compelling evidence which 
links corporate entrepreneurship and organisational performance. As Hornsby et al 
(2002:254) go on to say ‘there is still much to be learned about the substance and 
process of corporate entrepreneurship’. However, many of the studies on corporate 
entrepreneurship, including those by Hornsby and his colleagues, are based on 
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quantitative methodologies which cannot reveal organisational processes.  Equally, 
although there is ‘much exhortion’ to conduct longitudinal studies ‘the percentage of 
published research articles that report data collected at more than one point in time is 
minuscule’ (Monge, 1995:268). Ogbor (2002:623) is also critical of the reliance on 
quantitative methodologies ostensibly based on neutral, objective and value-free 
social science which dominate studies of entrepreneurship. Instead, he calls for 
qualitative approaches in which there is an ‘intimate collaboration between facts and 
theory’. Therefore, it is suggested that adopting a detailed case study approach 
allows researchers to observe a ‘chronological sequence’ which helps to ‘determine 
causal events over time’ (Yin, 1994). My view is that establishing causality in highly 
complex social organisations is extremely difficult whatever methodology is 
adopted. Rather, I concur with Barley (1986:81) who argues that mapping ‘emergent 
patterns of  action’ demands a detailed qualitative approach: ‘Retrospective accounts 
and archival data are insufficient for these purposes since individuals rarely 
remember, and organisations rarely record, how behaviours and interpretations 
stabilise over the course of the structuring process’. Longitudinal research remains 
rare in organisational studies and single cases raise issues of generalisability.  In 
discussing the shift from micro to macro levels  Hamel et al argue (1993) that the 
objectives are more  important than the number of confirmatory cases. This refers to 
the distinction between statistical generalisation (Yin, 1994), in which inference is 
made about a specific population, and analytical generalisation, in which empirical 
data are compared with a theoretical ‘template’.  
Data are drawn from a study of MFD a privately-owned manufacturing company 
founded over 50 years ago to supply casting and machined components to the 
Ministry of Defence. In 1999 MFD employed 70 monthly staff, 200 direct operators 
and 175 indirect staff. Until recently, most products were batch-manufactured but 
there is now increasing emphasis on higher volume work utilising flow-line 
assembly. In the past, MFD manufactured to contract and had little marketing 
expertise: ‘if you took the customers away you would have difficulty identifying 
production of a specific product’ (MFD manager). One expensive mistake was 
turning down a  contract to manufacture Dyson’s dual cyclone vacuum cleaner: ‘the 
opportunity didn’t fit the current profile of the business but Dyson also expected  
MFD to do the marketing’.  Currently the firm relies heavily on two customers: BT 
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and LaComm. Access to MFD was originally negotiated when senior managers 
agreed to participate in a doctoral research project investigating the nature of 
innovation networks in a range of mature manufacturing firms (Beckinsale, 2001). 
As supervisor, I visited the company and realised that it fitted my own research 
interests in the role of corporate entrepreneurship. Data were acquired from a variety 
of sources including observation, regular discussions with Gareth Williams (see 
below), company documents as well as fifteen interviews carried out over a two-
month period at the end of 2000. These semi-structured interviews, taking between 
45 and 60 minutes, were taped and obtained managerial views recent on events 
within MFD. Interviewees generally confirmed that change was initiated by the 
owner and managing director Mike Fletcher who was concerned about declining 
activity within the company as a result of fewer defence contracts. At an operational 
level, the change agent was Gareth Williams a middle-manager who, in contrast to 
most other white and blue-collar workers, had joined the company less than one year 
before the change programme began. 
Into the Modern World of Mass Production 
MFD was established in 1951 to supply equipment to the MoD and forty years later 
defence-related work still accounted for 60% of turnover. The decline in UK defence 
spending and the associated move away from cost-plus contracts to competitive 
tendering meant that the company could no longer rely on owner Mark Fletcher’s 
personal contacts to obtain business. Losing MoD business meant that  by 1994 the 
workforce had halved to 450 employees and for a while the company’s decline 
appeared likely to continue. Initially, two factors contributed to the turn-around: first, 
a gradual recognition throughout the management team that they had to actively seek 
new customers and, secondly, considerable investment in new manufacturing 
equipment. New business was generated by moving from batch manufacturing to 
light assembly work with the securing of contracts from BT and Dublin-based 
LaComm. Other changes initiated by Mark Fletcher included the recruitment of a 
number of ‘outsiders’ with experience in different industries. Gareth Williams had 
spent more than 20 years working for a large domestic appliance manufacturer which 
was organised according to Fordist principles. His ideas on material flows and the 
elimination of WIP (work in progress) were revolutionary to most long-serving MFD 
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mangers. A new post of marketing manager was filled by Peter Dawson who had 
experience in a range of firms including time spent as MD of a medium-sized 
manufacturing company. A new personnel manager was also recruited to replace the 
works director’s wife when she retired and he introduced a more conciliatory and 
democratic approach to relations with the shopfloor. 
‘It was first obvious with the recognition that the defence business 
would not be enough for us to survive on. The family have now 
recognised that there are other ways of doing things but that is not the 
only answer.  I think that there are other people who are going to 
determine how the company will be run rather than the familiar 
immediate group’ (Materials Director).  
Williams was initially in charge of management services with primary responsibility 
for control of labour costs via the issue of standard times. He quickly realised that 
there were a wide range of factors influencing the inefficient use of labour including 
an ancient and inflexible MRP system which made it extremely difficult to track 
flows of material through the factory. This was crucial because as a result of material 
shortages operator ‘waiting time’, paid at average earnings, was high. The work of 
white collar staff was also inefficient as supervisors, foremen and store-keepers spent 
a considerable amount of time searching for missing materials. After carrying out a 
detailed analysis Williams decided that the only way to improve efficiency was to 
purchase a new mainframe computer with software, including MRPII, capable of 
dealing effectively with the complexity of operations within MFD. Williams 
presented the results of his analysis and recommended the purchase of a new IT 
system at a cost of £250,000 and employment of 2/3 new technical staff to works 
director Ken Chalmers . Following discussions with Fletcher, Chalmers approved the 
project and Williams’s department were given responsibility for the purchase, 
installation and commissioning the new system. The computer was primarily 
intended to resolve problems associated with stock control and labour inefficiency 
but it was also designed to link all major functions within MFD. This meant 
obtaining departmental heads’ cooperation was necessary to improve transparency 
and incorporate their requirements into the specification.  As a result, there were 
considerable changes to the organizational routines (systems) with particular 
emphasis on greater openness, trust, flexibility and interaction with customers (there 
was broad agreement across the managerial group so illustrative quotations are 
representative): 
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‘It takes a lot of commitment from the guy signing the cheque. He 
can’t have cold feet at the first hiccup, he has to be 100% behind it 
and ask what will it take to do it, not can we do it, should we do it? 
We’ve answered those questions and now it’s time to ask what it will 
take to do it?  Don’t tell me  the problems come and tell me if I can 
help you to solve them.  These are new to MFD, total commitment 
from top-down and from bottom-up’ (Telecom Manager). 
 
‘I think the main change has been greater flexibility in terms of 
decision- making and authority, more flexibility in terms of freedom of 
movement, in terms of what we can and can’t do.  Opening up 
opportunities, you could call it greater trust.  This in turn reflects on 
the people working for me as well, I endeavour to give them more 
flexibility.  In the time I’ve been with the company, probably in the 
last 2 or 3 years I have seen more change than the rest of the time.  
I’m not sure whether that was a conscious decision made elsewhere 
or just the way that we’ve had to operate in terms of speed and 
response’ (Purchasing Manager). 
Evaluation of the external environment was the owner’s responsibility and as 
described above, it became obvious that reliance on MoD contracts was at an end. 
Mark Fletcher initiated substantial change by delegating responsibility to operational 
managers. There was gradual acceptance that the traditional top-down approach was 
no longer appropriate and employees at all levels had to be given greater 
responsibility for their day-to-day tasks. A further significant structural change was 
creation of ‘module champions’ who were given responsibility for liaising between 
their departments and the team introducing the new computer system. 
 
‘It’s difficult to be certain about the “relaxation” but there has been a 
change and I’m not exactly sure about the motives behind that but 
hopefully it is a greater trust in the people further down the line’ 
(Purchasing Manager). 
 
‘In one way it’s quite dramatic, it’s caused the company to look 
critically at  the business and take mostly appropriate action. 
Electronics  is a close-knit team and that side is now considerably 
stronger.  Also the company is confident to take that part of the 
business forward because it has a better understanding of what it is 
good at and therefore what it can market’ (Marketing Director). 
 
‘We’ve gone in at the bottom level and said we have to improve the 
response time to customers, improve the service (and) we need to do it 
in a number of ways.  By doing that they (operators) feel they have 
more responsibility and it’s raised spirits and that’s helped 
enormously with the success of the project’ (Industrial Engineer). 
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According to Denis et al (1996) effective change needs to be managed through high 
levels of collaboration. Further, the effect of strategic leadership can be categorised 
according to three outcomes: symbolic, substantive and political change. There was 
evidence of all three factors in MFD. Symbolic change occurred as a result of 
Fletcher’s willingness to spend more time in the plant talking to supervisors and 
managers. Ending his aloofness and isolation encouraged broader changes which 
helped create greater trust between managers and shopfloor workers. Other  symbolic 
changes emphasised the increasingly importance of ‘customers’: 
‘I think that we’ve had it very cosy and the real world is starting to hit 
us. LaComm have told us that we’ve got to find more customers 
because they’re competing against slick, lean operations and  they 
can’t support us.  We’ve got to go out and win business against other 
companies. We’ll have to prove we’re committed’ (QA Manager). 
 
‘The company has always  manufactured to customer requirements 
but that is a reactionary position.  A big impact is that now we’re 
proactive and draw customers in.  That is a dramatic difference and 
the awakening of that reality was brought about by LaComm but 
acceptance from the chairman down was not that easy’ (Materials 
Director). 
 
Substantive change occurred as a result of two major investments the first of which 
was the IT system approved in 1998. In December 1999 Williams instigated a second 
major capital investment in the assembly area. More than £350,000 was spent on a 
process line for automatically assembling printed circuit boards and a major 
reorganisation of the assembly shop to give a logical workflow and remove excessive 
work-in-progress. This was partly to satisfy the demands of LaComm who wanted 
MFD to adopt a more professional approach which would impress their own 
customers who sometimes visited sub-contractors. 
‘Mr Fletcher has spent a lot of money during the last 2 or 3 years.  If 
he hadn’t we’d be out of business because LaComm and BT would go 
elsewhere even if it was only to second-source suppliers. We’re tooled 
up for the electronics trade and we need to stay in it.  We’re buying 
dollops of equipment - a third of a million pounds a time’ (Works 
Manager). 
 
We’ve made significant improvements in quality standards, all round, 
image, housekeeping, general labour efficiency are all dramatically 
up (50%).  All of that is very good stuff and as well as that £100,000 
is being spent on equipment.  All of this originates from proper 
capacity planning and preparation. We’ve an awful to do before 
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we’re a really serious class act but we’re moving in the right 
direction (Production Supervisor). 
 
Political change was illustrated by shifting from an authoritarian approach to a 
management style that had elements of consultation if not participation. Bryn 
Griffiths, responsible for materials and assembly, was  extremely authoritarian. His 
office overlooked the shopfloor and if he saw operators talking he immediately 
summoned the supervisor and demanded they be disciplined. The supervisor 
described his tactics for dealing with these situations: 
‘I would go up to them and start waving my arms about as if I was 
giving them a right bollocking - but I would probably be saying 
“come on boys get back to work that bastard is watching you from the 
office”. I decided if I ever became a manager I would behave very 
differently - he taught me what not to do’. 
Early in 1999 when the mainframe had been implemented and most ‘teething 
problems’ overcome Chalmers decided that Williams’s role should be extended to 
include responsibility for electronic manufacturing and Bryn Griffiths reverted to 
materials manager. Williams’s approach was to give supervisors direct responsibility 
for dealing with shopfloor issues. Greater participation in decision-making at all 
levels and more consultation with shopfloor workers was  evident throughout the 
organisation: 
‘Working practices have changed and we’re in the modern world 
now.  Everything’s changed so dramatically from purchasing to 
manufacturing. The whole philosophy of the firm has changed and it 
seems to have gone in a different direction, the right way I think.  Now 
many more people get a say in what goes on. There are little sub-
committees and everyone is involved’ (Stores Manager). 
 
‘We’ve had successes there is no doubt about that in the sense that 
we’ve built a team environment rather than a tiered managerial 
environment on the telecoms side. That has been driven by the 
introduction of new blood and by recognising the potential of some we 
already had in the business.  We’ve been able to form the foundation 
of a much bigger business’ (Materials Director).  
 
Williams’s ‘championing’ of the mainframe and PCB line led to a number of other 
related changes. Up-to-date shopfloor information enabled the works manager and 
the materials manager to regain control of scheduling.  As discussed below, lack of 
regular management meetings allowed Williams to create a forum in which all those 
18 
whose jobs were affected by the new system were involved in discussion about its 
implementation. These meetings led to the creation of ‘module champions’ who were 
responsible for ensuring the views of every department were incorporated into the 
system design. Uniquely, information about the selection, purchase and 
implementation of the new system was passed on via regular meetings over a 12 
month period. As a consequence, staff were given the opportunity ‘buy-in’ to the 
new way of working without the imposition of an ‘alien’ system. Most managers 
identified Williams as the prime-mover in stimulating change and these quotes 
illustrate his success in becoming a corporate entrepreneur. 
‘The problem on the shopfloor has always been lack of parts that is 
the biggest moan that you will hear out there.  But that is one of the 
reasons that Gareth has taken over telecoms, the guy who was doing 
that job was a director.  Whenever products weren’t being produced it 
was him not ordering parts but he didn’t get a bollocking.  Now it’s 
better because Gareth shouts at Ken (Chalmers) to get things done. 
That’s a success, putting Gareth out there’ (IT Manager). 
 
‘It’s very interesting because when I joined the company 2 1/2  years 
ago they were a very staid, set in their ways and Gareth has 
introduced new methods and a whole different outlook and the 
reaction is very, very noticeable.  They’ve realised that they have got 
to get into gear to keep up with industry’(BT Production Manager). 
Mobilising Social Capital in MFD 
In examining links between social capital and corporate entrepreneurship in MFD I 
draw on the hypothesis developed by Gargiulo and Benassi (2000) which states that 
‘The higher the cohesiveness of a manager’s network the lower the manager’s ability 
to adapt the composition of that network to the co-ordination requirements of a new 
task environment’.MFD was certainly confronted by a new task environment as 
MoD-related activity declined in the early 1990s. Few  existing managers had 
external experience and there was no coherent vision of how the company could 
generate new business. An opportunity to steer a new direction came from a source 
which initially did not seem to offer a great deal of potential. One of the low-value 
activities carried out in MFD was the refurbishment of BT telephone coin-boxes. 
Although the work was both intermittent and labour intensive it helped keep existing 
workers employed in the hope that something more significant would eventually turn 
up. As a result of good relations established with BT, early in 1996 senior managers 
agreed to their request to  assemble a batch of telephones for the domestic market. 
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While employees had little experience of light assembly work it was carried out 
satisfactorily and eventually led to regular a contract for 2000 phones per month. 
Furthermore, this experience provided the opportunity to tender for a large contract 
to assemble telephones for LaComm who were expanding their  suppliers. The two 
companies had different attitudes to suppliers, in the case of BT as long as goods met 
acceptable quality standards they were satisfied. In contrast, LaComm actively 
managed their supply chain relationships and were very keen to encourage MFD to 
adopt a more professional managerial approach. Limited experience meant that 
existing managers struggled to respond in a way that was acceptable to 
representatives of LaComm. Managers at all levels were embedded in a batch-
production mind-set and did not fully understand the problems associated with high-
volume assembly involving stock control, consistent quality standards and just-in-
time manufacturing principles. 
As well as lacking up-to-date knowledge of manufacturing techniques MFD had a 
number of extremely cohesive groups including the senior management team and 
most sub-units such as the machine-shop and assembly departments. As Johanson 
(2001) points out, social closure at the unit level increases the likelihood of conflict 
between those units. Although the paternalistic culture discouraged open disputes, 
MFD was typified by a lack of trust and cooperation across the organization. Poor 
communication and the resultant social closure was influenced by a number of 
factors. First, the six senior managers had all worked in the company for at least 20 
years and formed a tight network which was difficult for other insiders to penetrate. 
Secondly, a bureaucratic structure discouraged informal links between functions and 
communication relied on departmental managers. Thirdly, first-line supervisors and 
technical staff were isolated from  decision-making which  involved Fletcher 
informing the works director what he wanted and Ken Chalmers passing this 
information on to the management team. As a result, existing employees had been 
socialised into accepting the prevailing norms  of behaviour which emphasised 
deference to Fletcher and the senior managers. This deference was reinforced by the 
economic importance of MFD to an area in which there were few other opportunities 
for regular, well-paid employment. Until Gareth Williams’s appointment no-one 
within the company was willing to challenge this paternalistic culture which 
rewarded those who accepted existing norms of behaviour. Also, by ensuring there 
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was widespread consultation about the exact operational requirements he mobilised 
the skills and knowledge of first line supervisors and  technical staff: 
‘Gareth has created a lot of movement, you have to give him credit for 
getting through to the top level as much as he has done.  It was a very 
high wall to get over but he managed it and to be fair they have given 
him backup.  He is very enthusiastic and that enthusiasm has 
transferred down’ (QA Manager). 
Williams was recruited  in March1997 to take charge of management services and, as 
discussed above, quickly decided that it was necessary to replace the obsolete 
computer system. The need to satisfy LaComm combined with the introduction of a 
new mainframe computer was the catalyst for major organizational changes. Before 
joining MFD Williams had spent more than twenty years working for a major 
domestic appliance manufacturer. His experience in a number of roles ranging from 
production engineer to manufacturing manager had given him a comprehensive 
understanding of how to run a modern, high-volume, high-quality, production plant. 
Not feeling bound by existing conventions and having confidence in his ability to 
enact change meant Williams was able to mobilise support by building network 
linkages across the organization. One notable aspect of MFD operations was the 
works director’s relationship with the management team. Chalmers never held 
management meetings but instead had informal discussions with individual 
managers. This provided Williams with an opportunity to take the initiative by 
arranging meetings to discuss implementation of the new IT system in which he 
outlined his view of the company’s future direction. For example, both first-line 
supervisors and senior mangers were committed to maintaining ‘arrears’ as a 
‘guarantee’ for shopfloor work. By ensuring work was carried out two, three, four or 
even more weeks behind schedule everyone knew that  shopfloor activity could be 
maintained at least until arrears were cleared. This way of thinking had been 
encouraged by the ‘cosy’ relationship with the MoD who seemed not to expect 
deliveries on-time. Even when new business was obtained with customers such as 
BT this ‘routine’ of working in arrears remained in place. Representatives of 
LaComm were unwilling to contemplate late deliveries and the demands of their 
engineers and buyers stimulated change. The problem was, until Williams’s 
appointment there was no-one within the company who had experience of efficient 
scheduling and mass-production. He also championed the creation of module 
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champions who were responsible for ensuring their departments had ‘voice’ in the 
design and implementation of the IT system. 
Social closure amongst groups within the company limited opportunities for existing 
staff to interact on an informal level. Equally, the presence of these strongly cohesive 
groups meant that MFD  was typified by ‘structural holes’ which could be exploited 
by individuals not linked into existing networks. In Burt’s (1992) terms this created 
‘brokerage’ opportunities for someone willing to adopt the role of corporate 
entrepreneur. To do this, Williams built trust amongst senior management group as 
well as with other groups across the organization including those responsible for 
material control and first-line supervisors. The latter group were essential in making 
the new system work effectively because it meant abandoning the traditional way of 
working in ‘arrears’ with large stocks of work-in-progress (WIP) in favour of a 
Kanban system based on just-in-time principles. As quotes in the preceding section 
illustrate Williams, by championing a new IT system and introducing up-to-date 
manufacturing techniques, instigated significant changes within MFD. Building 
linkages which spanned both hierarchical and lateral groups helped mobilise social 
capital (Coleman, 1988) by creating an environment typified by greater flexibility, 
trust, responsibility, involvement and teamworking. This is not to suggest that there 
was widespread resistance to change rather, existing managers were unable to 
breakout of their conventional mind-sets. It is important to acknowledge the role of 
buyers and engineers from LaComm who encouraged the adoption of more modern 
approaches to management and manufacturing. Everyone, from shopfloor to Mark 
Fletcher, knew long-term survival depended on convincing LaComm representatives 
that MFD could become a major supplier of electronic components and this helped 
Williams give the change direction and purpose. 
‘I’ve been involved in the change in working practices, the change in 
the type of people that we are employing – different skills, retraining 
of employees, changes in health and safety requirements and all the 
associated things that go with it, costs, manual handling, risk 
assessments all the rest of it’ (Personnel Manager). 
MFD provides an important illustration of corporate entrepreneurship because it was 
typified by a structure and culture which reinforced resistance to change. At the same 
time, there was a recognition across the organization that change was necessary if the 
company was to survive. The problem was there was no-one was willing or able to 
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implement radically (for the company) new ways of working. There are two other 
issues worthy of mention: first Williams did not regard his activities as 
‘entrepreneurial’ as he felt that he was simply doing his job to the best of his 
abilities. Secondly, social capital (Coleman, 1988) and structural hole theory (Burt, 
1992) are not management ‘tools’ which can be applied in a similar way, for 
example, to Porter’s five-forces. Rather, the mobilisation of social capital within 
MFD relied heavily on Williams’s social skills defined by Fligstein (1997:397) as 
‘the ability to motivate other actors by providing those actors with common meaning 
and identities in which action can be undertaken and justified’.To use their social 
skills entrepreneurs must be aware of two factors: the roles of various groups within 
an organisation and the type of ‘strategic action’ likely to ‘make sense’ given the 
prevailing conditions. Fligstein (1997) uses the work of Lukes (1974) to set out 
tactics available to strategic actors which include direct authority, agenda setting, 
framing action, brokering, remaining goalless and making others think they are in 
control. The tactics actors adopt depend on their relative positions and whether the 
organization is stable or in crisis: 
‘Fluid situations mean that strategic actors must find a way to bring 
together as many groups as possible to form a center or core. Thus 
tactics that emphasize connecting to others are most important’ 
(Fligstein, 1997:400). 
MFD was not in crisis at the time Williams joined but it was widely recognised that 
if they failed to fulfil LaComm’s requirements the consequences would be extremely 
serious. Thus, the organization was permeated by a sense of urgency and a 
willingness, at all levels, to accept new ways of working. 
Conclusions  
MFD, a mature manufacturing company, faced a number difficulties over the last ten 
years including the loss of its main customer the MoD. The process of change 
reported here encompassed a three-year period from January 997 to early 2000. 
Workforce numbers had declined to one-third of those employed in the late 1980s 
which encouraged managers and shopfloor workers to accept radical solutions. 
Owner Mark Fletcher  recognised the need to move into new markets as a result of 
losing the company’s MoD core business. The research began at approximately the 
same time Gareth Williams was employed as management services manager early in 
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1997. After a relatively short period in which he evaluated the existing situation 
Williams suggested to the works director a number of major changes including  a 
substantial investment in a new IT system to improve managerial control across the 
organization.  
Because of its relative geographic isolation, there was little voluntary turnover and 
the majority of employees and managers had spent many years in MFD. In addition, 
owner-manager Mark Fletcher adopted a patrician style of management which 
encouraged high levels of deference amongst shopfloor workers and lower-skilled 
white-collar employees. At the same time, the workforce were expected to trust the 
management team and demonstrate their loyalty to the company. As most employees, 
including the management team, lived in the same small town there were numerous 
social and familial links within the organization. Unfortunately, the highly 
bureaucratic structure of MFD restricted the potential for mobilising this social 
capital because of ‘closure’ amongst a range of groups within the organization. 
Opportunities for existing employees to adopt the role of ‘corporate entrepreneurs’ 
were also restricted by both bureaucracy and the lack of links to external knowledge 
sources. The chance to release the motivational potential of social capital within 
MFD came with the recruitment of two ‘outsiders’ to middle management roles. 
Employing a marketing manager was in itself a radical change because the company 
had relied primarily on Fletcher’s personal contacts in the MoD to generate sales.  
It is generally accepted that the term ‘entrepreneur’ refers to someone willing to 
break through resistance to change that exists in any society or organisation 
(Schumpeter, 1934). Although, as Ogbor (2000:616) points out: ‘The discourse says 
that most people are unable to do this since they can only handle what is familiar to 
them’. Ogbor (2002) goes on to make a number of relevant points related to the role 
of ideology in promoting entrepreneurs as ‘heroic’ individuals. However, other than 
making the usual poststructuralist demands for the ‘deconstruction’ of 
entrepreneurial myths he makes no attempt to acknowledge the positive role played 
by entrepreneurs in encouraging and promoting change from which we all benefit. 
While many still associate entrepreneurship with a Right-wing political bias it is 
increasingly acknowledged that enterprising individuals play a positive role in all 
aspects of society (Leadbeater, 1997). Also, the majority of middle managers 
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adopting the role of corporate entrepreneurs are unlikely to receive extrinsic rewards 
in the form of stock options associated with more senior managers. Rather,  
individuals become corporate entrepreneur because of the intrinsic satisfaction they 
gain from managing the change process and the broader contribution they can make 
in ensuring that the organisations in which they are employed are innovative and 
successful.  
The primary focus of this paper has been on the activities of Gareth Williams who 
was initially employed as management services manager. Williams employed skills 
gained in a mass-production environment to implement up-date manufacturing 
activities within the company. He also adopted a boundary-spanning role which 
enabled him to exploit the structural holes between senior managers, supervisors and 
shopfloor employees as well as linking the various functional activities with MFD. In 
many ways the mobilisation of social capital was an unintended consequence of what 
Williams saw as simply carrying out his responsibility to make the company more 
effective in the way in which resources were managed. The paper is not intended to 
offer prescriptions for ‘better’ management based on the ‘exploitation’ of social 
capital. Rather, the case illustrates that structural holes do exist in organizations 
which are typified by a dense network of relations. It also demonstrates that radical 
organization change in mature and relatively stable organizations demands an inflow 
of personnel and ideas from external sources. 
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